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INTRODUCTION 
An increasing consensus has arisen at the level of practice, 
policy, and theory that the various mechanisms of transitional 
justice should be mobilized as part of a response to violent 
conflict and must serve as a pillar of postconflict peacebuilding.1 
More than ever, the question is not whether there will be some 
kind of transitional justice, but what the timing, modalities, and 
sequencing might be and which of the mechanisms from the 
transitional justice “toolbox”—including trials, truth 
commissions, vetting and lustration, reparations, and broader 
institutional reform—will be put in place. Together with 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ex -
 combatants, security sector reform, broader “rule of law” 
programs, and elections, transitional justice initiatives have 
become a routine part of the postconflict checklist.2 Viewed 
from an historical perspective, the emergence of this transitional 
justice consensus some twenty years after the term was coined is 
nothing short of remarkable.3 
Despite the seeming consensus as to the necessity to “do 
something,” the increasingly privileged place of justice in 
international affairs and postconflict reconstruction begs some 
very important questions: justice for what, for whom, and to what 
ends?4 In particular, while there is increasing momentum behind 
                                                                                                                            
1. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893, 
894 (2002) (noting the emergence of a “steady State” phase of transitional justice in 
which “the post-conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception 
to the norm”); see also Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical 
Reflections, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 275, 276 (2008) (noting the standardization of 
transitional justice). 
2. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: REBUILDING FAILED STATES, 
AFRICA REPORT NO. 87, at 9 (2004) (criticizing a mechanistic “operational checklist” 
approach to postconflict peacebuilding in which the international community assumes 
it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series of initiatives: deployment of 
peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first 
election). 
3. For an interesting discussion of how this seeming consensus masks a deeper 
politicization and debate, see generally Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals 
of Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 95 (2008). 
4. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 280–86 (employing the categories of when, whom, 
and what in order to challenge the “standardization” of the field of transitional 
justice). For a discussion of the idea that it may not always be the case that we need to 
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the notion that the tools of transitional justice must be 
marshaled in response to large-scale human rights atrocities and 
physical violence—including murder, rape, torture, 
disappearances, and other crimes against humanity—the proper 
role of transitional justice with respect to economic violence—
including violations of economic and social rights, corruption, 
and plunder of natural resources—is far less certain. Indeed, 
historically, economic violence and economic justice have sat at 
the periphery of transitional justice work.5 To the extent that 
transitional justice has dealt with economic issues, these 
concerns have been treated as little more than useful context in 
which to understand the perpetration of physical violence.6 
Despite some increasing attention to the issue on the part 
of academics and a handful of truth commissions, ignorance of 
economic violence continues to be one of the principle blind 
spots of the field of transitional justice, a bias that transcends 
many of the debates and dilemmas of traditional transitional 
justice theory and practice. While the blind spots of transitional 
justice mirror historic divisions and hierarchies within 
international human rights law, they also parallel the liberal 
international peacebuilding consensus in which Western liberal 
market democracy is assumed to be the ideal end product of 
postconflict reconstruction and a “package” of interventions is 
tailored to suit.7 This parallel suggests that despite some twenty 
years of evolution, the field of transitional justice has not moved 
far from its origins in which the “transition” in question was 
assumed to be a transition to a Western-style liberal market 
democracy. 
As the field of transitional justice moves beyond its historic 
origins in the wave of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and away from its 
                                                                                                                            
“do something” in the transitional justice context, see PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, 
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 183–205 (2001). 
5. See Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing why “economic, social, and cultural rights 
have not traditionally been a central part of transitional justice initiatives”). 
6. See Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional 
Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266, 275–76 (2008). 
7. See Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT’L 
SEC. 54, 56 (1997); see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding 
and Strategies of Transitional Justice, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 579, 580–81 (2007). 
2012] ADDRESSING ECONOMIC VIOLENCE 783 
roots in law and legalism, to a United Nations (“UN”)-
sanctioned global phenomena tied to conflict prevention more 
generally, the almost exclusive emphasis on civil and political 
rights and justice for physical violence appears increasingly 
untenable. First, it is untenable because this emphasis provides a 
distorted narrative of conflict premised on the notion that 
economics and conflict can be neatly separated.8 When seen 
through this lens, conflicts become one dimensional, when in 
reality they are a messy and complicated mix of political, social, 
economic, and cultural factors. Second, relegating economic 
issues to the background of transitional justice limits and biases 
the range of policies imagined to be necessary in the wake of 
conflict. Because poverty and economic violence can be 
associated with the onset of conflict, exacerbated by conflict, 
and continue afterwards as a legacy of conflict, failure to strike a 
better balance between a range of justice concerns in transition 
is unlikely to generate policies and interventions that respond to 
“root causes” and may serve to obfuscate and legitimate very 
serious human rights abuses.9 The language of “never again” has 
little meaning if the self-imposed blind spots of the field distort 
our understanding of the conflict and limit our range of 
possible solutions. 
While greater inclusion of economic issues within the 
transitional justice agenda therefore seems necessary, it also 
raises difficult questions that have yet to be worked out at the 
level of theory, policy, and practice. For example, while some 
would find unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice 
mechanisms should include in their ambit economic and social 
                                                                                                                            
8. See Miller, supra note 6, at 268.  
9. See PAUL COLLIER ET AL., WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL 
WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 22 (2003) (arguing that civil wars are more likely in 
low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and have negative effects 
that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). Collier once famously argued that 
over fifty percent of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed 
settlement. See Paul Collier & Anne Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 13, 17 (2002). However, both figures have been disputed by some 
and revised by Collier himself. See, e.g., Astri Suhrke & Ingrid Samset, What’s in a Figure? 
Estimating Recurrence of Civil War, 14 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 195, 197–98 (2007) 
(explaining how they and others have arrived at figures closer to twenty percent after 
using the Correlates of War data set, and citing Collier’s 2006 working paper, which 
established a twenty-three percent war recurrence rate for the first four years after the 
cessation of conflict). 
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rights violations that took place during the conflict itself—a 
group of rebels stealing food from a village, for example, in 
violation of the laws of war—the question arises as to whether we 
should also include deeper issues of distributive justice and 
structural violence that predate the conflict and that may have 
in part helped to precipitate it. If we find ourselves focusing on 
issues of deep-rooted structural violence, is this the proper work 
of the field of transitional justice, or should it be left to the work 
of “development” and longer-term political and social 
processes? In sum, are we asking too much of transitional justice 
by suggesting that it grapple with economic violence? 
This Article seeks not to answer any of these questions 
definitively, but argues that a more nuanced, contextualized, 
and balanced approach to a wider range of justice issues faced 
by societies in transition is necessary. To this end, this Article 
proposes that one way to achieve a more balanced approach is 
to reconceptualize and reorient the “transition” of transitional 
justice not simply as a transition to democracy and the “rule of 
law,” the paradigm under which the field originated, but as part 
of a broader transition to “positive peace,” in which justice for 
both physical violence and for economic violence receives equal 
pride of place.10 Such a reorientation would not guarantee or 
even mandate greater emphasis on economic concerns in all 
cases. The notion of “positive peace” could ultimately be 
subjected to limiting constructions and understandings that 
would in effect reimpose a version of liberal international 
peacebuilding, and thereby exclude many economic and 
distributive justice issues from its purview. Nevertheless, I argue 
that insofar as the very idea of “positive peace” has at its core 
issues of structural violence, it calls upon one to attend to a 
broader set of concerns than has historically been considered in 
transitional justice practice. Reorientation around the concept 
could be an important step in the direction of bringing 
                                                                                                                            
10. As discussed in greater detail below, the term “negative peace” refers to the 
absence of direct violence. It stands in contrast with the broader concept of “positive 
peace,” which includes the absence of both direct and indirect violence, including 
various forms of “structural violence” such as poverty, hunger, and other forms of 
social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE 
RES. 167 (1969) (discussing different definitions of the word “peace” often used by 
researchers).  
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economic violence into the foreground of transitional justice 
practice and policy. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth the 
traditional focus and preoccupations of transitional justice, a 
field which has historically been rooted in law, human rights, 
and the felt imperatives of a political transition to Western 
liberal democracy, but which is increasingly allied with broader 
notions of peacebuilding. Part II discusses the relationship 
between transitional justice and economic violence, a broad 
constellation of issues that have largely been excluded from 
transitional justice work to date. It articulates some of the 
arguments against inclusion of economic violence and argues 
that any costs are largely outweighed by the benefits. Part III 
examines the relationship between transitional justice and the 
emerging field of peacebuilding, including the critique of 
liberal international peacebuilding, and sets forth the heart of 
my argument that one way to promote greater focus on issues of 
economic justice in transition would be to reconceptualize the 
field of transitional justice as a transition to “positive peace.”  
A note about terminology is in order before proceeding. In 
this Article, the terms “physical violence” and “economic 
violence” are used as shorthand to refer to a range of 
phenomena. “Physical violence” refers to murder, rape, torture, 
disappearances, and other classic violations of civil and political 
rights. In contrast, “economic violence” refers to violations of 
economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural 
resources. While the violence that characterizes “physical 
violence” is often direct, “economic violence” is typically more 
indirect. Both terms are clearly oversimplifications. For 
example, not all violations of civil and political rights involve 
direct physical violence, and many violations of economic and 
social rights—hunger and starvation, for example—are arguably 
a form of physical violence. While most of the “physical 
violence” discussed in this Article constitutes a violation of civil 
and political rights under international law, the concept of 
“economic violence” includes, but is broader than, violations of 
economic and social rights under international law.11 
                                                                                                                            
11. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
786 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:780 
Nevertheless, as a form of shorthand, both terms constitute 
loose categories that are useful to a discussion of the historical 
emphasis and blind spots of the field of transitional justice. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND PREOCCUPATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
Many of the practices associated with the modern field of 
transitional justice—trials, truth commissions, reparations 
schemes, and broader reform of abusive institutions—have deep 
historical roots.12 Nevertheless, transitional justice, as a domain 
of policy, practice, and academic study, has its roots in the late 
1980s and early 1990s with the wave of transitions in both 
Eastern Europe and Latin America following the end of the 
Cold War.13 Definitions of transitional justice vary and have 
evolved and broadened over time.14 Broadly speaking, 
“transitional justice” relates to a set of legal, political, and moral 
dilemmas about how to deal with past violence in societies 
undergoing some form of political transition.15 Arguments for 
the necessity of some form of transitional justice are often 
grounded in notions of atrocity prevention and deterrence 
                                                                                                                            
12. For a review of the use of what have become known as the tools of transitional 
justice dating back to more than 2000 years ago in ancient Athens, see generally JON 
ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2004). Other authors looking to the historical underpinnings of transitional justice 
practice identify the Nuremburg tribunal as a key juncture initiating the first “phase” of 
transitional justice. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 69, 70 (2003). 
13. See generally I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). 
While the term “transitional justice” was coined some twenty years ago, it has been 
argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct “field” until some time 
after 2000. See Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 329–32 (2009) (tracing the history of 
the use of the term “transitional justice”); Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, 
Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’ 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 5, 
7 (2009) (arguing that transitional justice did not emerge as a distinct field until after 
2000). 
14. Many of these definitions have been quite narrow and legalistic. For example, 
Ruti Teitel defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with 
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the 
wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Teitel, supra note 12, at 69 (footnote 
omitted). For a review of how some of these definitions have broadened over time, see 
Nagy, supra note 1, at 277–78.  
15. See Sriram, supra note 7, at 582–83. 
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(“never again”), nation building (building or restoring 
democracy and the “rule of law”), and moral necessity (just 
deserts).16 While the precise type of political transition to be 
undergone is not always made explicit, the transitional justice 
practice, policy, and scholarship in the 1990s largely focused on 
the felt necessities and dilemmas of a transition from more 
authoritarian forms of government to Western-style democracy, 
with a consequent focus on those mechanisms thought best to 
bring about the specific political transition in question.17 As 
discussed in greater detail below, the notion of transition as 
transition to democracy was “crucial to structuring the initial 
conceptual boundaries for the field.”18 
Although a number of the concerns and preoccupations of 
transitional justice were similar to those of the human rights 
community from which many early transitional justice scholars 
and practitioners were drawn, including particularly concerns 
with accountability and impunity for massive human rights 
violations, the field of transitional justice distinguished itself in 
its attempt to balance twin normative aims: the demands of 
justice and accountability on the one hand, and the assumed 
needs of a political transition on the other.19 Thus, formative 
debates in the field focused on the possible dilemmas and trade-
offs associated with justice in times of political transition, 
including the so-called peace versus justice debate.20 Influential 
                                                                                                                            
16. See Bell, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing the different overlapping conceptions 
of the field of transitional justice). 
17. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 325 (arguing that transition to democracy was the 
“dominant normative lens” through which political change was viewed in the early 
years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Patricia Lundy & Mark 
McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 265, 273 (2008) (arguing that “‘[t]ransition’, as normally conceived within 
transitional justice theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of 
democratization and democracy based on liberal and essentially Western formulations 
of democracy”). 
18. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 326.  
19. See id. at 358.  
20. In recent years, transitional justice advocates have tended to see the various 
and sometimes contradictory goals of transitional justice as complementary. See 
Leebaw, supra note 3, at 98. The mutually complementary nature of peace, justice, and 
democracy has also become a United Nations (“UN”) doctrine at least since the 2004 
publication of a report on transitional justice. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 
(Aug. 23, 2004) (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually 
exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”). 
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articles by Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel Huntington, 
canonized in Neil Kritz’s seminal three-volume work, viewed the 
parameters of justice in times of transition to democracy as a 
function of a series of bargains between elite groups, with more 
or less justice available depending on the extent to which elite 
perpetrator groups were able to dictate the terms of the 
transition.21 
Although dealing with massive human rights violations 
while undergoing a political transition might arguably call for 
the range of expertise of a variety of professions and disciplines, 
including history, psychology, economics, education, and 
religion, to name only a few, early transitional justice advocates 
were largely drawn from the legal and human rights 
communities and early transitional justice scholarship was 
primarily anchored in law and political science.22 Today, the 
field of transitional justice is increasingly interdisciplinary, yet 
law, legalism, and human rights approaches to the questions and 
dilemmas of transition continue to dominate in many ways, 
leading to a continued critique of the “narrowness” or 
“thinness” of traditional transitional justice work and calls to 
give greater attention to those issues often set in the background 
of legal and human rights discourse, including religion, culture, 
economics, and local tradition.23 
                                                                                                                            
21. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, reprinted in I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, supra note 13, at 65–81; 
Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, reprinted in I GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH 
FORMER REGIMES 57, 57–64 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). 
22. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 333. 
23. See Kora Andrieu, Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and 
the Liberal Paradigm, 41 SEC. DIALOGUE 537, 541 (2010) (noting the “strong and 
persistent influence of legalism on transitional justice”); Bell, supra note 13, at 9 
(discussing the broadening of the field to include disciplines beyond law); Kieran 
McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34 J.L. & 
SOC'Y 411, 417 (2007) (criticizing the legalistic penchant of transitional justice and 
arguing that “legalism tends to foreclose questions from other complementary 
disciplines and perspectives which transitional lawyers should be both asking and 
asked”). See generally Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass 
Violence, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009) (calling for a revalorization of local 
and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation). 
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Since the birth of the field in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
more overt preoccupation with transition as transition to 
democracy has receded. Increasingly, transitional justice is 
associated with nation building and peacebuilding in the 
postconflict context more generally.24 Once considered a 
jurisprudence of exception and deviation from rule of law 
standards in times of political transition, transitional justice has 
been normalized, institutionalized, and mainstreamed.25 In 
attempting to trace “three generations” of transitional justice, 
starting with Nuremburg and moving into the present, Ruti 
Teitel refers to this latest phase as “steady-state” transitional 
justice in which the postconflict dimension of transitional justice 
is moving from the exception to the norm.26 The “transition” in 
transitional justice today is “ostensibly neutral” and the goals 
promoted, including conflict resolution and the rule of law, are 
less explicitly political.27 Other more recent and influential 
definitions of transitional justice make little use of the concepts 
of “transition” at all, rooting the field instead in the promotion 
of a number of goals, including accountability and 
reconciliation.28 
The most iconic mechanisms associated with transitional 
justice continue to be prosecutions and truth commissions.29 
Beyond this, however, the field has broadened a great deal since 
                                                                                                                            
24. See Chandra Lekha Sriram et al., Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of 
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 13 (JAD-PbP, Working Paper Series No. 1, May 
2009) (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of 
peacebuilding activities). 
25. McEvoy, supra note 23, at 412. For an argument that the “dilemmas” of 
transitional justice are not exceptional, but in fact resemble those of “ordinary justice,” 
see generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 762 (2003). 
26. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 894; Teitel, supra note 12, at 89–92.  
27. Leebaw, supra note 3, at 103, 106.  
28. For example, according to a landmark UN report:  
[Transitional justice] comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, 
with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and 
individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, 
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.  
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 20, ¶ 8. 
29. See Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with 
Corruption and Economic Crimes?, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 310, 315 (2008). 
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the early 1990s to include a range of mechanisms and practices 
designed to encourage reconciliation and forms of 
accountability far short of a prison sentence.30 Thus, fostering 
community-level dialogue between former perpetrators and 
survivors of human rights abuses and the construction of public 
memorials to preserve memory of the conflict are as much a part 
of transitional justice as a prosecution before a war crimes 
tribunal. Despite new and innovative practices around the 
margins, however, “steady state” transitional justice is 
persistently criticized for being “top-down” and “one-size-fits-
all,” rote application of a mere template to contexts and 
situations to which it is perhaps ill-suited.31 It is perhaps to be 
expected that as transitional justice becomes mainstream, 
scholars and practitioners attempt to deconstruct the 
assumptions, constructed boundaries, limitations, and blind 
spots implicit in the template. 
After several decades of evolution, transitional justice 
practice and policy today is stitched together from strands of 
overlapping and at times competing narratives. It is, at various 
times, a battle against impunity rooted in human rights 
discourse, a set of conflict resolutions techniques related to the 
formation of a new social and political compact in the wake of 
conflict, and a tool for international intervention and state 
building.32 The multiplicity of narratives suggests an open-
textured project subject to contest and reconceptualization. At 
the same time, many transitional justice narratives share a 
common denominator of being firmly grounded in neutral, 
technical, and apolitical vocabularies of human rights and the 
rule of law that have the potential to obscure the politics of the 
transitional justice project itself.33 The decision to use the 
                                                                                                                            
30. See, e.g., BRIAN GORMALLY & KIERAN MCEVOY, THE COMMUNITY FOUND. FOR N. 
IR., DEALING WITH THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND ‘FROM BELOW’: AN EVALUATION 
10–11 (2009). 
31. See, e.g., Lundy & McGovern, supra note 17, at 271 (criticizing the “one-size-
fits-all” and “top-down” approaches to transitional justice). 
32. Bell, supra note 13, at 13–15.  
33. Compare id. at 27 (showing how many concepts in traditional justice, such as 
justice, democracy, and rule of law, often are contested concepts), with McEvoy, supra 
note 23, at 420–21 (positing that “a crude characterization of human rights in 
contemporary transitional justice discourses would suggest that human rights talk lends 
itself to a ‘Western-centric’ and top-down focus; it self-presents (at least) as apolitical; 
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mechanisms associated with the transitional justice template—
prosecutions, truth commissions, vetting and lustration, reform 
of abusive security institutions—and not other mechanisms, just 
like the decision to focus on abuses of civil and political rights 
and not economic and social rights is itself a political choice 
with important policy consequences that have implications for 
distributive justice in the postconflict context. The next Part 
explores the relationship between transitional justice and 
“economic violence,” a category that subsumes a wide range of 
issues rarely brought to the core of transitional justice work. 
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE 
As the Cold War recedes in time, conflicts across the globe 
are increasingly intrastate in nature, less fueled by a grand 
global ideological battle than by local struggles for resources 
and control of government.34 The majority of these conflicts now 
take place in some of the poorest countries on earth.35 As the 
reports of media, human rights, and conflict resolution 
organizations vividly illustrate, societies emerging from civil war 
and other forms of conflict are often completely devastated: 
civilians are killed and traumatized; infrastructure—from roads 
and the electric grid to schools and hospitals—are destroyed; 
and key institutions of governance are hollowed out by years of 
                                                                                                                            
[and] it includes a capacity to disconnect from the real political and social world of 
transition through a process of ‘magical legalism’”). 
34. This is not to minimize the legacies of colonialism and Cold War politics, or 
the role of the modern-day scramble for resources in shaping many conflicts in the 
developing world. Indeed, there has been a persistent failure of transitional justice 
mechanisms to account for the effects of “outside actors” on the course of conflict. See 
HAYNER, supra note 4, at 75–77. There are exceptions to this trend, however, including 
Chad, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 
35. Many of the examples chosen in this Article are African, not because conflict 
and transitional justice are unique to the continent, but because Africa provides some 
of the starkest examples of the stakes of both violent conflict and the enterprise of 
peacebuilding. Of the thirty poorest countries in the world, only two are located 
outside of sub-Saharan Africa. Over half of all sub-Saharan Africans continue to live on 
less than US$1.25 per day. Given the endemic poverty, Africa is a continent that can 
scarcely afford to be made poorer by conflict. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human 
Development Report 2009, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, at 172–74 
(2009), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009 (click 
“Download” under “HDR 2009”); United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2009, at 6 (2009), available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/
MDG_Report_2009_ENG.pdf. 
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conflict, corruption, and mismanagement. Despite the best 
efforts of local and international communities to build peace in 
the wake of conflict, a significant number of these conflicts will 
reignite in the years following their apparent settlement.36 
Transitional justice and international prosecutions are, of 
course, global phenomena. Nevertheless, for a number of 
reasons, both political and economic, it seems likely that much 
of their application in the coming years will be in the poorer 
countries of the global south, particularly sub-Saharan Africa.37 
The causes of the conflicts that lead to calls for the application 
of transitional justice are multiple and complex, the full extent 
of which is beyond the scope of this Article. While poverty and 
economic violence are only pieces of this larger conflict 
resolution puzzle, they remain important ones, central to 
conflict dynamics in many countries.38 It is against this backdrop 
of poverty and the persistent failure to resolve violent conflict in 
so many parts of the world that economic violence in 
“mainstreamed” transitional justice should be considered today. 
A. Economic Violence in Transitional Justice Practice 
Violent conflict devastates both lives and livelihoods, yet 
ways of understanding what constitutes “violence” and who 
counts as a “victim” vary a great deal. From the trials at 
Nuremburg to the international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to truth commissions in South 
Africa and elsewhere, the conception of violence implicit in 
most transitional justice initiatives has been an exceedingly 
narrow one. The overwhelming focus of most transitional justice 
                                                                                                                            
36. COLLIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 155. 
37. Indeed, the sheer number of indictments emanating from the International 
Criminal Court involving African countries has generated significant controversy on 
the continent, leading in part to an African Union vote to halt cooperation with the 
court with respect to the indictment of Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir. See African Union in 
Rift with Court, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
8133925.stm. Although countries such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States 
also would likely benefit from the application of transitional justice practices, great-
power politics and Security Council vetoes continue to make this appear less likely than 
in the smaller, poorer countries of the world. 
38. See COLLIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 20–31, 53 (arguing that civil wars are more 
likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and cause 
negative effects that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). 
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interventions across time has been on accountability for physical 
violence—murder, rape, torture, disappearances—and 
violations of civil and political rights more generally.39 A broader 
conception of violence that would encompass often equally 
devastating forms of “economic violence”—including violations 
of economic and social rights, endemic corruption, and large-
scale looting of natural resources such as oil, diamonds, and 
timber—has been largely absent. 
To take a famous example, under the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) Act, a “victim” was 
limited to individuals who had suffered gross violations of 
human rights, including killing, abduction, torture, or ill-
treatment.40 The social, economic, and political system of 
apartheid, in many ways the very embodiment of the concept of 
structural violence, was largely treated as context to instances of 
egregious bodily harm that became the TRC’s principal focus. 
When viewed through this lens, the quotidian violence of 
poverty and racism, and the victims and beneficiaries of the 
apartheid system itself, receded into the background.41 As we 
approach two decades since the end of white rule in South 
Africa, apartheid has ended, but the de facto economic and 
social status quo has not changed to the degree many would 
have hoped. Poverty, inequality, and crime remain high.42 
Although transitional justice has addressed horrific forms of 
violence in South Africa that took place under the apartheid 
system, it also may have had the perverse effect of obfuscating 
and legitimating other abuses of power, leaving many of those 
who benefitted most from the apartheid economic system 
comfortable in the status quo. 
The “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns can 
have serious long-term effects, both in terms of our 
understanding of conflict itself and in terms of the remedies 
thought necessary to prevent recurrence.43 As Zinaida Miller 
                                                                                                                            
39. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 284. 
40. See Pablo de Greiff, Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1, 8 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006). 
41. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 284 (discussing the standardization of transitional 
justice). 
42. See Patrick Bond, Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa’s 
Elite Transition, 60 J. INT’L AFF. 141, 141 (2006). 
43. See Miller, supra note 6, at 280–87. 
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argues, pushing economic issues to the periphery of transitional 
justice concerns helps to shape a distorted and one-dimensional 
narrative of conflict in which economics and conflict can be 
neatly separated.44 At best, economic issues become part of the 
context, helping to explain why the physical violence that is the 
focus of a truth commission’s work may have occurred, but are 
of little further policy relevance. At worst, a truth commission’s 
work may be almost completely decontextualized, presenting a 
diagnosis of human rights violations that is abstracted from 
reality and the dynamics of social power and conflict.45 
If the dynamics that produced massive human rights 
violations are poorly understood, creating a distorted narrative 
of conflict that relegates economic issues to the background, 
this may in turn limit and bias the range of policies imagined to 
be necessary in the wake of conflict. When conflicts are viewed 
through a one-dimensional lens, prevention of human rights 
abuses becomes a simplistic function of punishment and 
impunity. At the same time, the emphasis on physical violence 
and violations of civil and political rights likely means that the 
issues of economic violence and inequality that may have partly 
helped to generate the conflict will go unaddressed by the 
various mechanisms of transitional justice. Thus, we are more 
likely to see a focus on prosecution of a handful of members of 
abusive security services, vetting and dismissals, and perhaps 
more general judicial and security sector reform than remedies 
involving some measure of social restructuring, such as 
affirmative action, redistributive taxation, or land-tenure 
reform.46 
Even where the mechanisms of transitional justice have 
looked to economic violence as part of their work, the human 
toll of economic violence rarely receives equal treatment when it 
comes to the recommendations and policies that are articulated 
as part of the work of prevention and follow-up. For example, 
the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in 
East Timor actually documented violations of economic and 
                                                                                                                            
44. See id. at 268. 
45. Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and 
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 3 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 337 (2008). 
46. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 362. 
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social rights in some depth, yet when it came time to decide who 
was a “victim” for purposes of receiving reparations, the 
definition was limited to victims of violations of civil and political 
rights.47 Whether justified under the banner of resource 
constraints, such practices have the effect of promoting 
hierarchies of rights and granting de facto impunity to the 
architects of economic violence.48 
Where transitional justice mechanisms do grapple with the 
economic impacts of conflict and abusive governments, they 
rarely do so using a human rights paradigm, even though many 
of the abuses in question may constitute violations of 
international law.49 Lisa Laplante, for example, explores how 
truth commissions in Guatemala and Peru exposed decades of 
structural violence and other socioeconomic injustices as one of 
the causes of wars in their countries, but did not frame their 
analysis or recommendations in terms of violations of economic 
and social rights.50 While the work of these truth commissions is 
important in that it can help provide “a causal connection 
between violence and structural inequalities,” Laplante argues 
that the failure to help different constituencies understand that 
in many instances economic violence also constitutes a violation 
of economic and social rights deprived “national groups a 
                                                                                                                            
47. See CHEGA! THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND 
RECONCILIATION TIMOR-LESTE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 40–41, 140–45 (2005). 
48. Although formally the legal equal of civil and political rights, economic and 
social rights often have been seen as second tier in a hierarchy of rights, as implied by 
their designation as “second generation” rights. 
49. Beyond the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
economic, social, and cultural rights have the status of binding law in a number of 
international human rights treaties. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 13, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 4, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, arts. 7, 26, 40, 64, 67, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. 2, 4(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006); Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights art. 3, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; European Social 
Charter arts. 16–17, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights art. 20, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58. 
50. See Laplante, supra note 45, at 335; see also Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility 
of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 141, 148, 159–61 (2007) (providing a more detailed analysis of the work of 
the Peruvian truth commission). 
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powerful lobbying tool to challenge the government’s inaction 
or resistance.”51 Without rights-based scaffolding, subsequent 
development programs and other initiatives targeting inequality 
become mere charity or government largesse rather than 
responses to concrete violations of international human rights 
law to which individuals are entitled. By framing instances of 
physical violence in terms of violations of rights, yet failing to do 
the same with respect to violations of economic and social 
rights, this approach further contributes to the conception that 
economic and social rights are not “real rights,” but mere 
aspirations. 
B. Understanding the Marginalization of Economic Violence in 
Transition 
From the potential for deterrence inherent in criminal 
prosecutions to the cries of “never again,” transitional justice 
has long been rooted in the rhetoric of the prevention of future 
abuses. Given the potential to misdiagnose the causes of conflict 
and bias the necessary remedies, understanding why an entire 
subset of issues so central to conflict dynamics—violations of 
economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural 
resources—have historically been so far from the core of 
transitional justice work and preoccupation is no easy task. 
While the factors underpinning such a gaping blind spot are 
many, this Article argues that there are at least two factors that 
are central to understanding the marginalization of economic 
violence in transitional justice work: (1) an importation of 
implicit distinctions and hierarchies from mainstream human 
rights discourse and practice, and (2) the consequences of 
viewing transitional justice as a transition to a Western-style 
democracy rather than a transition to “positive peace.” 
International human rights discourse and practice self-
consciously wraps itself in an aura of impartiality and 
universality. It is ostensibly apolitical, and the rights contained in 
the core international covenants relating to both civil and 
political as well as economic and social rights are repeatedly said 
                                                                                                                            
51. Laplante, supra note 45, at 350.  
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to be “indivisible,” as per the UN mantra.52 In practice, the 
seeming consensus regarding universality and indivisibility 
masks a series of deep and abiding controversies and debates 
relating to the proper place of economic and social rights under 
international law. The Cold War roots of this debate, which split 
the atom of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two 
separate covenants to be championed by competing world 
powers, are well-known and will not be rehearsed here in 
detail.53 Key for current purposes is the fact that the ripple 
effects of the implied hierarchical distinction between so-called 
“first generation” and “second generation” rights continue to 
be felt many years after the Cold War’s end. 
During much of the 1990s, the “formative years” for the 
field of transitional justice, even the world’s largest human 
rights organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, were slow to include documentation of violations of 
economic and social rights in their work and did so only 
gradually. Although some of this reluctance has been attributed 
to “methodological difficulties,” it is also true that a number of 
high-profile activists of the time, including Aryeh Neier, were 
publically skeptical as to whether economic and social rights 
were “real,” and staunchly believed that civil and political rights 
should be the exclusive focus of human rights organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch.54 As previously discussed, many 
transitional justice scholars and advocates were drawn from the 
human rights community of this period.55 One might add that 
                                                                                                                            
52. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, ¶ 5, at 5 (July 12, 1993); see also 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 
18, 2000). 
53. See Arbour, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the Cold War roots of the current 
status of economic and social rights); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
54. See Curt Goering, Amnesty International and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
in ETHICS IN ACTION: THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 204 (Daniel A. Bell & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds., 
2007) (tracing the history of Amnesty International’s ambivalence towards economic 
and social rights); see also Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 
64 (2004) (explaining the particular methodological challenges associated with trying 
to apply a “naming and shaming” documentation strategy to violations of economic 
and social rights). 
55. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 333. 
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the historic ambivalence towards economic and social rights 
within the human rights community mirrors a similar 
ambivalence within mainstream justice and criminal law about 
social justice more generally.56 It is perhaps not surprising, 
therefore, that many of the lawyers drawn into the early human 
rights movement may have brought this ambivalence with them. 
While the implicit hierarchies of rights created by decades 
of human rights practice are only slowly starting to unravel,57 the 
backgrounding and foregrounding of economic and social 
rights and civil and political rights in many ways mirror broader 
trends in human rights discourse and practice, which were also 
imported into transitional justice work. The following chart 
summarizes the various historic dichotomies and oppositions 
that have been broadly reflected in both human rights discourse 
and practice and in transitional justice policy and practice.58 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
56. See Arbour, supra note 5, at 5.  
57. Human Rights Watch, for example, has in recent years published a number of 
reports looking at the linkages between natural resources, corruption, and violations of 
economic and social rights. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights 
Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, 19 HUM. 
RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2007, at 15–18, 40–53 (contending that the local government in 
Rivers State, Nigeria, has violated its duty to progressively realize rights to health and 
education through widespread and flagrant corruption and mismanagement of oil 
revenues); Human Rights Watch, Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil 
Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2004, at 
57–59 (arguing that, due at least in part to mismanagement and corruption, the 
government of Angola has impeded Angolans’ ability to enjoy their economic, social, 
and cultural rights, including healthcare and education, in violation of the 
government’s own commitments and human rights treaties to which it is a party). This 
is in stark contrast to their work in the previous decade when violations of economic 
and social rights would only be examined to the extent that they were associated with 
violations of civil and political rights, such as racial or gender-based discrimination.  
58. While in some ways a gross oversimplification, the implicit politics of human 
rights discourse and practice that is embedded in these oppositions has long been the 
subject of criticism. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: 
Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109–10 (2002) (discussing the 
foregrounding and backgrounding of human rights discourse); Makau Wa Mutua, The 
Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA J. INT’L L. 589, 604–07 (1996) (criticizing the peripheral 
nature of economic and social rights and local and traditional approaches to justice 
under the mainstream Western approach to human rights thinking and practice). 
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Set in the Foreground Set in the Background 
Civil and political rights 
The public 
The state and  
The individual 
The legal 
The secular 
The international 
The modern 
Form, process, participation, 
procedure 
Institutional enforcement 
Strict rules 
Rights as neutral, apolitical 
“trumps” 
 
Economic and social rights 
The private 
The community, 
group, corporation 
The political 
The religious 
The local 
The traditional 
Substance 
 
Cultural, social enforcement 
Flexible standards 
Rights as implicating hard policy 
choices with political and 
distributional consequences  
 
Critical literature in both transitional justice and human 
rights has attempted to bring elements of the background into 
the foreground of thinking and policy.59 Thus, one persistent 
trope in the critique of mainstream transitional justice is the 
need to re-emphasize local rather than international agency, 
and local cultural traditions of justice and reconciliation rather 
than Western and international approaches.60 Similarly, there is 
a critique of the more technocratic and legalistic bent of 
mainstream transitional justice and an effort to underscore the 
importance of considering local political contexts as well as the 
political and distributional consequences of certain 
approaches.61 In this way, one might situate the emerging 
                                                                                                                            
59. See generally Kennedy, supra note 58 (highlighting various arguments that 
“circulate in the background of conversations about the human rights movement”). 
60. For a review of some of the debates regarding the incorporation of local 
justice mechanisms into transitional justice initiatives, see generally Roger Duthie, Local 
Justice and Reintegration Processes as Complements to Transitional Justice and DDR, in 
DISARMING THE PAST: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND EX-COMBATANTS 228 (Ana Cutter 
Patel et al. eds., 2009). 
61. See, e.g., Lundy & McGovern, supra note 17, at 273–74; McEvoy, supra note 23, 
at 417–18. 
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critique of the “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns 
within transitional justice as part of a wider project of resistance 
to mainstream transitional justice, which derives itself from 
attempts to open up and democratize human rights discourse 
and practice. 
The thrust of the mounting criticism is not to delegitimize 
that which has been traditionally placed in the foreground, or to 
imagine that what has been placed in the background is 
necessarily more “empowering.”62 All of the oppositions 
provided in the chart above can be flipped and used as 
platforms for contestation and resistance by marginalized 
persons based on the times and needs of the situation. Thus, in 
certain times and places, mobilizing the concept of the 
“international” to counter strong appeals to local tradition 
might serve an important emancipatory goal for oppressed 
persons. At other times, taking shelter under the shield of the 
“local” might be used to fend off invasive international 
interventions that might reduce local agency and autonomy. 
The key in illustrating these oppositions is to find a more 
nuanced and contextual approach to the fundamental questions 
raised by transitional justice: how should societies respond to massive 
human rights violations and is it possible to do so in a way that will 
build long-term positive peace? Central to this inquiry is the 
consideration of the reasons for which certain issues have been 
either backgrounded or foregrounded, and the distributional 
consequences of placing an issue in either the background or 
the foreground. 
Beyond importation of implicit hierarchies from human 
rights discourse and practice, the second factor key to 
understanding the peripheral status of economic violence in the 
transitional justice agenda is found in the notion of transition 
itself. The idea of transition suggests a journey from a starting 
point towards an unspecified destination. It suggests a period of 
exception, of time-bounded rupture. While the exact duration 
of the transition in question is never made explicit, the very 
notion of transition might have the tendency to narrow one’s 
temporal focus to a relatively brief period of the most egregious 
abuses, excluding the potentially deep and complex 
                                                                                                                            
62. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 110.   
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socioeconomic roots of conflict, and to suggest measures that 
are themselves narrowly time limited. Thus, transitional justice 
institutions are more likely to view human rights abuses—
torture, for example—as functions of the excesses of certain 
segments of the security sector or possibly on the orders of 
higher-level government officials in an attempt to cling to 
power, and not as deeper expressions of racism, rampant 
inequality, historic deprivations, or other issues of structural 
violence. 
Because transition can also suggest a particular destination, 
it may dictate in part the exceptional measures necessary to 
reach the intended goal. Not only does the diagnosis affect the 
prescribed remedy, but our very notion of what it means to be 
healthy also helps determine the course or treatment. Thus, 
Paige Arthur queries, how might the transitional justice 
“toolbox” look different if the paradigmatic transitions in the 
1990s were considered to be transitions to socialism rather than 
transitions to democracy, and largely Western forms of 
democracy at that?63 Might there have been a greater emphasis 
on issues of distributive justice, including the need for 
progressive taxation in countries experiencing radical 
inequality, land-tenure reform in countries where land-based 
conflict has been a driver of violence, and affirmative action in 
countries with historically-marginalized classes? While one can 
only speculate, what can be said is that the notion of transition 
as transition to liberal Western democracy surely had a limiting 
and narrowing effect on the “toolbox” that exists today. 
C. Potential Objections to Greater Focus on Economic Violence in 
Transition 
Putting these historical constructions and limitations aside, 
even while greater emphasis on issues of economic violence 
within the transitional justice agenda seems necessary, striking a 
better balance between physical and economic violence also 
raises difficult questions that have yet to be worked out at the 
levels of theory, policy, and practice. For example, while some 
would find unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice 
mechanisms should include within their ambit economic and 
                                                                                                                            
63. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 359.  
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social rights violations that took place during the conflict itself—
a group of rebels stealing food from a village, for example, in 
violation of the laws of war, or a warlord that sold off diamonds 
and timber to buy weapons in similar violation—should we also 
include broader distributive justice and structural violence issues 
that predate the conflict, and which may have, in part, helped to 
precipitate it? 
We might characterize these two approaches as “thick” and 
“thin” means of addressing economic violence in the 
transitional justice context. Taking a relatively thin approach 
and looking only at the economic violence perpetrated during 
the conflict itself might prove to be relatively uncontroversial. 
Suppose, however, that in a given country there is an attempt 
during a transitional period to address some of the deeper 
legacies of abusive systems of governance, such as income 
inequality, the need for deeply redistributive taxation, and wide-
scale land-tenure reform. Such was arguably the case in South 
Africa at the end of apartheid, yet it is also recognized that 
leaving the economic status quo largely intact was one of the 
“bargains” struck and the price paid for a bloodless transition.64 
While some have argued that addressing economic legacies of 
conflict in transition might in fact enlist more support from the 
general population and therefore be even more feasible than 
seeking accountability for violations of civil and political rights, 
this does not account for the role of elites.65 A group of elites 
might be willing to see a handful of army officers or warlords 
prosecuted, but attempting radical revision of the political and 
economic status quo that has existed for decades might be 
another story. In the end, many transitions depend in some 
measure on the “buy-in,” or at least on the lack of resistance on 
the part of elite constituencies. Thus, relatively robust or “thick” 
approaches to addressing historical economic violence might 
create the possibility of backlash, reanimating the “peace versus 
justice” debate along economic lines. 
While more evaluation and research would be needed to 
predict the potential for backlash based on configurations of 
elites and their role in the transition itself, it should be noted 
                                                                                                                            
64. See Bell, supra note 13, at 14. 
65. See Roger Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice, 
2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 292, 307 & n.63 (2008). 
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that the risk of a hostile and possibly even violent response is not 
a dilemma unique to addressing economic violence in 
transition. Indeed, much has already been said about how the 
parameters of transition justice may be shaped by the extent to 
which elites and perpetrator groups dictate the terms of the 
transition.66 One might note, however, that in those few 
instances where truth commissions have made 
recommendations related to addressing socioeconomic 
inequalities, those recommendations tend to be ignored by 
policy makers.67 This may be a more likely outcome than 
backlash, although if framed properly, such recommendations 
might nevertheless serve as a strong lobbying platform for civil 
society actors who wish to press for reforms.68 
Beyond the potential for backlash, one of the most 
frequently noted objections relates to the additional cost and 
complexity that would stem from an expansion of the mandates 
of transitional justice mechanisms to include economic 
violence.69 It is a fact widely noted that the costs of even a narrow 
approach to transitional justice, particularly prosecutions, can 
be enormous, especially at a time when most governments, 
reeling from the effects of conflict, have little money to spare.70 
Compounding the cost issue is the risk of expanding the 
mandate of truth commissions and other transitional justice 
mechanisms so broadly that it will be nearly impossible to fulfill 
in the limited time typically allotted.71 It would seem sensible to 
question whether this is really the context for trying to grapple 
with “broad-based development or distributive justice policies 
that aim to redress widespread violations of the economic and 
                                                                                                                            
66. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 21, at 65–81; O’Donnell & Schmitter, supra 
note 21, at 57–64.  
67. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 45, at 350 (discussing how the Guatemalan 
government largely ignored key recommendations of the Guatemalan Commission on 
Historical Clarification, including a progressive tax system and increased state spending 
on human necessities).  
68. See id. at 333–34, 350.  
69. See Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus 
Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 256 
(2008) (discussing the problems with the high cost of transitional justice measures in 
development). 
70. See id. 
71. See Duthie, supra note 65, at 306–07. 
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social rights of poor citizens.”72 But while the cost and time 
issues are far from specious, it should be noted that many 
transitional justice mechanisms already are funded in part by 
outside actors.73 It is quite possible that measures to address 
economic violence in the transitional justice context would find 
support from complementary constituencies, particularly insofar 
as they touch upon questions of national economic 
development. Some have also argued that attempting to recoup 
money lost to economic violence in the form of embezzlement 
and corruption could be one way to help fund transitional 
justice initiatives focusing on economic issues.74 
There are also broader concerns associated with the 
dilution of the transitional justice enterprise. If one were to take 
a robust or “thick” approach to economic issues during periods 
of political transition, shifting the paradigm from transition to 
what some have called “transformation,” at what point does this 
better suit the work and expertise of traditional economic 
development actors and longer-term political and social 
processes?75 Seeking accountability for physical violence alone 
has been a monumental task, but over several decades, this work 
has made an impact on the normative and institutional global 
landscape.76 That is no small achievement, and trying to do too 
much could risk even the modest change that has been 
achieved. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has argued, “broadening the 
scope of what we mean by transitional justice to encompass the 
building of a just as well as peaceful society may make the effort 
so broad as to become meaningless.”77 
                                                                                                                            
72. Id. at 299. 
73. See id. at 302–03. 
74. See Carranza, supra note 29, at 324–25. 
75. See Lambourne, supra note 23, at 46 (advocating a “transformative” justice 
model of transitional justice); see also Laplante, supra note 45, at 332 (arguing that truth 
commissions might contribute to longer-term processes of political and economic 
transformation). 
76. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 
1, 1–8 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). See generally KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING 
WORLD POLITICS (2011) (discussing accountability in the context of prosecutions for 
human rights abuses). 
77. Id. at 2.  
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While concerns that transitional justice efforts may become 
too diffuse need to be taken seriously, the global project of 
transitional justice cannot be made more meaningful, and the 
world made more just, if a significant portion of the drivers of 
conflict and resulting violations of international law are pushed 
to the side. There will always be a risk of trying to do too much, 
wagering the legitimacy and capital of the transitional justice 
enterprise by reaching beyond the possibilities for social and 
political change at any given time. The point, however, is that 
the dividing line between too much and too little transitional 
justice should not be an arbitrary one based on distinctions 
between physical and economic violence. Rather, it should be 
based on a careful analysis of the drivers of conflict and the 
social, political, and financial capital that can be marshaled to 
effect change via the various mechanisms of transitional justice 
in the wake of conflict. 
In the end, working through these and other questions 
related to the wider acknowledgment of economic and social 
rights at the level of theory, policy, and practice will require 
years of effort and study. In this sense, they are little different 
than the dilemmas and trade-offs associated with civil and 
political rights in the transitional justice context, most of which 
have yet to be fully worked out some twenty years after the birth 
of the field. Key to providing the impetus for such a complex 
and sustained process will be a change in thinking about the 
nature of the transitional justice enterprise and the notion of 
transition itself. The following Part explores what it might mean 
to reframe transitional justice not as a transition to democracy, 
the rule of law, or some kind of postconflict stability, but as a 
transition to “positive peace.” 
III. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE, AND PEACEBUILDING 
In the context of transitional justice debates, the concept of 
“peace” has at times been mobilized as one of resistance to the 
advance of particular transitional justice mechanisms and 
policies.78 This is manifest most clearly in the so-called “peace 
versus justice” debate, in which some form of transitional justice, 
                                                                                                                            
78. See, e.g., CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE VS PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004). 
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typically a prosecution, is imagined to stymie or preclude 
chances for a negotiated peace agreement.79 The debate also 
arises when it comes to the choice as among different elements 
of the transitional justice “toolbox,” including whether to have 
prosecutions or a truth commission and whether to have 
international prosecutions or mechanisms of accountability 
rooted in local tradition and custom.80 While there are an 
increasing number of concrete examples in which prosecutions 
have arguably advanced the cause of peace, and while the UN 
has officially embraced the notion that peace and justice are 
mutually complementary, the “peace versus justice” debate has 
proved to be an enduring one, resurfacing most recently in 
International Criminal Court indictments of Omar Al Bashir of 
Sudan and Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda.81 
The concept of peace is not part of the daily working 
vocabulary of many lawyers and human rights advocates who 
                                                                                                                            
79. As an example of this phenomenon, in 2003, the then-chairman of the 
Economic Community of West African States, President John Kufuor of Ghana, urged 
the UN to set aside the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone on the grounds that it was necessary to facilitate a negotiated settlement to 
Liberia’s civil war. See Liberia: ECOWAS Chairman Urges UN to Lift Taylor Indictment, IRIN 
HUMANITARIAN NEWS & ANALYSIS, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?
reportid=44642 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
80. Increasingly, there is a recognition that no one mechanism of transitional 
justice can hope to fulfill the many aspirations ascribed to it, and multiple overlapping 
mechanisms are thought to be necessary. For an exploration of the “truth versus 
justice” debate, see generally Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crimes: A 
Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002); Reed 
Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION (New York), Apr. 30, 2001, at 25. For 
an argument that international prosecutions can subvert local judicial and 
reconciliation practices while unwittingly playing into national-level politics, see 
generally Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS 
& INT’L AFF. 179 (2007). 
81. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 20 (positing that “[j]ustice, peace 
and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing 
imperatives”); PRISCILLA HAYNER, CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE & INT'L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY 
FOR JUSTICE 8–9 (2007) (arguing that the indictment of Charles Taylor advanced the 
peace process in Liberia, even though it was criticized at the time as potentially 
undermining peace negotiations); Louise Arbour, Editorial, Justice v. Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/opinion/16iht-edarbour. 
1.16197765.html (justifying her decision to indict Slobodan Milošević by showing that it 
ultimately advanced the cause of peace, even though it was criticized at the time for 
threatening the peace process). 
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comprise the communities that provided the initial intellectual 
capital to the transitional justice enterprise, and few transitional 
justice scholars today situate their work in the context of peace 
or peacebuilding.82 Nevertheless, the notion of peace is perhaps 
no more or less nebulous than the concepts of “justice,” 
“accountability,” “reconciliation,” and the “rule of law” that 
typically pepper transitional justice discourse. Although rarely 
defined as such, the concept of peace that is put in opposition to 
justice in the context of the “peace versus justice” debate is 
typically that of “negative peace,” meaning the absence of direct 
physical violence.83 Thus, if the threat of prosecution is feared to 
prevent a group of rebels from signing a peace agreement, and 
the guns may keep firing, justice could be said to undermine 
(negative) peace.84 A similarly narrow view of peace can be 
found when Ruti Teitel expresses the fear that as transitional 
justice mechanisms become increasingly associated with nation 
building, transitioning societies will give up on the “ambitious 
goals of establishing the rule of law and democracy” in favor of 
the more modest aims of “maintaining peace and stability.”85 
The notion of negative peace that has often been employed 
in transitional justice discourse and debates is a much narrower 
concept of peace than the notion of “positive peace” discussed 
in this Article, which involves not just the silence of AK-47s and 
the absence of the direct violence of hot conflict, but also the 
absence of more indirect forms of violence, including forms of 
structural violence such as poverty, corruption, radical 
economic, social, civil, and political inequalities, and other 
forms of social injustice.86 Positive peace may well embrace, but 
                                                                                                                            
82. Andrieu, supra note 23, at 539 (noting that “few transitional justice scholars 
have yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead 
through the dominant lens of legalism and human rights”); see Lambourne, supra note 
23, at 29 (explaining that “few researchers have analysed the relationship between 
justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding”). 
83. See Galtung, supra note 10, at 2; Lambourne, supra note 23, at 34.  
84. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman & Alexis Okeowo, Warlord’s Absence Derails Another 
Peace Effort in Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A9 (discussing the refusal of Joseph 
Kony, leader of a rebel group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army that is responsible 
for widespread human rights abuses in Uganda and neighboring countries, to attend 
peace negotiations due in part to indictments from the International Criminal Court). 
85. Teitel, supra note 1, at 898. 
86. See generally Galtung, supra note 10 (discussing different constructions of 
“positive peace” and “negative peace”). 
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is broader than, many of the traditional goals of transitional 
justice, including establishing democracy and building the rule 
of law. After all, there are many modern democracies in which 
the rule of law is firmly established that nevertheless manifest 
high levels of poverty and other forms of structural violence.  
Without making use of the term, transitional justice 
advocates often seem to assume that accountability will lead to a 
type of positive peace.87 Thus, for example, the concept of peace 
might be marshaled by the advocates for transitional justice as 
part of an argument that a potential amnesty agreement will not 
secure “lasting peace” or that the particular type of justice to be 
meted out by transitional justice mechanisms is necessary to 
“long-term peace.” It is perhaps then assumed that the 
transition that is set in motion will allow the type of social and 
economic development that may lead to positive peace. As 
Alexander Boraine has argued, “[t]he overall aim [of 
transitional justice] should be to ensure a sustainable peace, 
which will encourage and make possible social and economic 
development.”88 More typically, however, transitional justice 
advocates debate issues of amnesty and prosecutions in a more 
legalistic idiom, asking, for example, whether there is a duty to 
prosecute under international law, or whether amnesties are 
compatible with international law.89  In these discussions, 
broader notions of peace are often relatively absent.  
A. International Peacebuilding 
The concept of positive peace overlaps but is not 
synonymous with the evolving concept and field of 
peacebuilding. At the international institutional level,90 the field 
and practice of peacebuilding in the postconflict context 
evolved out of the much more limited peacekeeping operations 
                                                                                                                            
87. See Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60 
J. INT’L AFF. 17, 26 (2006). 
88. Id. 
89. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (discussing the duty to 
prosecute or grant amnesty under international law). 
90. This Article distinguishes between peacebuilding at the “international 
institutional level,” which emanates in large part of the United Nations, and the various 
types of interpersonal, community-level, and “track-two” peacebuilding that are done 
by individuals, religious groups, and nongovernmental organizations. 
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of the Cold War, in which neutrality, consent, and minimum 
force were considered paramount (often referred to as “first-
generation” peace keeping).91 With the end of the Cold War, 
these limited operations soon gave way to more complex and 
multidimensional initiatives in which the UN was called upon to 
address underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian 
problems inextricably linked with local politics. The seemingly 
inevitable involvement in increasingly complex postconflict 
initiatives culminated in the 2005 creation of the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission, which has been tasked with 
facilitating integrated approaches to postconflict reconstruction 
throughout the UN system and beyond.92 
The term “peacebuilding” was not defined as part of the 
Peacebuilding Commission’s creation, but has continued to 
evolve along with emerging policy and practice. According to a 
working definition adopted by the UN Secretary-General’s 
Policy Committee in 2007, it “involves a range of measures 
targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict 
by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace 
and development.”93 Despite the apparent breadth of this 
working definition, at the level of major international 
institutions, including the UN and multi- and bi-lateral donors, 
peacebuilding today typically consists of a more-or-less 
standardized package of initiatives that include demobilization, 
disarmament, reintegration, security sector reform, broader 
“rule of law” initiatives, elections, and, increasingly, the various 
mechanisms of transitional justice.94 In this way, transitional 
justice initiatives have become a routine part of the “postconflict 
                                                                                                                            
91. Some refer to three different generations of peacekeeping, which evolved in 
quick succession in the early 1990s. See, e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: 
THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 238 
(2004). Others, such as Roland Paris, distinguish between “traditional peacekeeping” 
and “peace operations.” See Roland Paris, Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global 
Culture, 9 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 441, 448–50 (2003). 
92. See G.A. Res. 60/180, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005); 
S.C. Res. 1645, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
93. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 18 
(2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 
94. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 280 (noting various transitional justice initiatives 
associated with peacebuilding). 
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checklist” that is associated with liberal international 
peacebuilding.95  
B. Using a Positive-Peace Paradigm 
The principal contention of this Article is that one way of 
giving equal pride of place to justice for both physical and 
economic violence in the transitional justice context, thereby 
creating a more balanced approach to both civil and political 
and economic and social rights, would be to reconceptualize 
transitional justice not as a simply political transition, 
democratic or otherwise—the paradigm out of which the field 
evolved—but as part of a broader transition to positive peace. 
Under this paradigm, the conception of justice shifts from 
“justice for or in transition” and “justice versus peace” to 
“justice for positive peace.” Grounding the field in such a 
conception would be one way of helping to push past the 
boundaries of mainstream transitional justice and liberal 
international peacebuilding. 
Anchoring the field of transitional justice in the concept of 
positive peace could potentially have at least three positive 
effects. First, it would likely broaden the approach from a 
relatively narrow and legalistic one focused on physical violence 
and civil and political rights to one that would also grapple, 
where appropriate, with the socioeconomic underpinnings of 
conflict, including various forms of structural and economic 
violence. Second, as the achievement of positive peace is a long-
term endeavor, the notion of justice for positive peace implies 
preventative strategies that look beyond the confines of an 
unspecified political transition. In doing so, transitional justice 
mechanisms may be conceptualized more holistically to blend 
with ongoing development and peacebuilding initiatives 
associated with postconflict reconstruction, and may potentially 
be marshaled in an effort to address the ongoing violence and 
                                                                                                                            
95. See Andrieu, supra note 23, at 538 (describing how transitional justice has 
become “an apparatus within the wider peace building ‘package’”); Sriram, supra note 
7, at 585 (arguing that “responses to recent mass atrocities or human rights abuses are 
now an integral part of peacebuilding by bilateral donors, regional organisations, and 
international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank”). 
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criminality that is typically associated with postconflict 
situations.96 
Third, the notion of justice for positive peace suggests that 
the determination of the modalities and mechanisms of 
transitional justice should be grounded in a context-based 
inquiry into the particular roots and drivers of the conflict in 
question. This stands in contrast to a package of mechanisms 
drawn from a toolbox of “best practices” with some sort of 
predetermined political endpoint, be it elections or democracy, 
or based on a more abstract set of deontological goals, including 
accountability and just deserts. Best practices, packages, and 
toolboxes in one country might have little relevance to building 
positive peace in another. For example, Paige Arthur has 
speculated that while many of the dominant themes and 
responses to violence of mainstream transitional justice evolved 
out of the Latin American experience, these responses might 
not be optimal for countries with “different histories, cultures, 
and positions within the world economy.”97 Many countries in 
Africa with a history of neopatrimonial government, corruption, 
and very weak state institutions might need to focus on a 
different set of issues through a different set of mechanisms.98 
Focusing on positive peace as the ultimate goal of the 
mechanisms of transitional justice could be one way to refocus 
attention on the context-specific interventions needed to move 
in that direction. 
A paradigm shift in the direction of positive peace would 
not dictate a “thick” or “thin” approach to economic violence in 
transition, or even ensure that economic violence would be 
addressed at all. As with all transitional justice mechanisms and 
modalities, the needs and limits of the context would have to be 
considered. Depending on the context, addressing economic 
violence might not always be necessary, or even desirable. As 
                                                                                                                            
96. For a more detailed look at potential connections between transitional justice 
and development, see generally Duthie, supra note 65 (arguing that transitional justice 
measures should be designed and implemented in a way that focuses on a synergistic 
links between transitional justice and development); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009) 
(discussing the issues and considerations arising from the connection between 
transitional justice and development). 
97. Arthur, supra note 13, at 360. 
98. See id. at 361. 
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Chandra Lekha Sriram argues, simply presuming that more 
justice necessarily generates or equates to more peace is 
potentially problematic.99 This presumption should be avoided 
with respect to both mainstream transitional justice and a more 
holistic form of traditional justice that would also grapple with 
legacies of economic violence in transition. 
C. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding 
In attempting to ground the field of transitional justice in a 
paradigm of positive peace, it is important to be wary of limiting 
constructions in which the notion of positive peace would simply 
be reshaped to fit and support existing practices and paradigms. 
Despite the potentially expansive nature of the field and 
concept of peacebuilding as discussed above, a trenchant 
critique has been that actual peacebuilding practice, if not 
theory as well, tends to reflect a paradigm of liberal 
internationalism in which faith in market economies and 
Western-style liberal democracy is conceived as the unique 
pathway to peace.100 Because many developing countries have 
little experience with democracy, the emphasis on elections, 
democracy, and free markets associated with the typical package 
of postconflict peacebuilding interventions can be both 
dangerous and destabilizing.101 In a number of ways, the critique 
of liberal international peacebuilding parallels the critique of 
mainstreamed transitional justice, in which the transition is 
implicitly conceived of as a transition to Western liberal 
democracy and elements of economic violence and social justice 
are moved to the periphery.102 
These historic constructions of the fields of transitional 
justice and peacebuilding illustrate how the concepts of peace, 
peacebuilding, and justice can be marshaled in ways that are 
both limiting and expansive; ways that can empower but also can 
obfuscate hierarchies of power and further perpetuate 
                                                                                                                            
99. Sriram, supra note 7, at 580. 
100. See Paris, supra note 7, at 56; see also id., supra note 7, at 580.  
101. For this reason, Roland Paris advocates what he calls “institutionalization 
before liberalization,” which would prioritize strengthening institutions and 
regulations before any rush to elections. See Paris, supra note 7, at 57–58. 
102. For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see generally Sriram, supra 
note 7. 
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inequalities. Thus, any attempt to build the notion of 
transitional justice as transition to positive peace requires special 
attentiveness to these dynamics. Nevertheless, one might argue 
that the benefit of the positive-peace paradigm is not that it 
offers a concrete goal that is any more precise or less subject to 
being co-opted than “justice,” “democracy,” “reconciliation,” or 
the “rule of law.” In the end, these may all be “essentially 
contested concepts.”103 At the same time, because the very core 
import of the concept of positive peace calls upon one to attend 
to a broader set of concerns than has historically been the 
practice of both liberal international peacebuilding and 
mainstream transitional justice, it may offer a better starting 
point than existing paradigms. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last two decades, the field of transitional justice has 
distinguished itself from its parent field of international human 
rights, in part due to its more overt grappling with the hard 
policy choices that lie at the intersection of law and politics and 
of justice and peace. At the same time, there has been an 
implicit politics at work in the backgrounding and 
foregrounding of various aspects of transitional justice concern. 
If mass atrocities and physical violence have been placed in the 
spotlight, issues of equally devastating economic and social 
justice have received little attention. 
The choice of which justice issues to focus on in a given 
context, be it physical violence, economic violence, or some 
combination of the two, is itself a political choice with 
distributional consequences. The goal of reorienting transitional 
justice as a transition to positive peace is not to remove politics 
or pretend that transitional justice is or ever could be an 
apolitical project. Rather, the concept of positive peace calls 
upon us to be attentive to these choices, whether justice is 
imagined to serve the needs of a political transition to liberal 
market democracy, or something else. Thus the goal is not to do 
away with politics, but to bring them back to the surface and free 
them from the confines of a technocratic and legalistic discourse 
                                                                                                                            
103. Bell, supra note 13, at 27. 
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that too often serves to obscure and legitimize the implicit 
politics at work. 
While addressing a wider range of justice concerns than has 
previously been the case will create serious challenges, failure to 
address these concerns may ultimately undermine the goals of 
transitional justice itself, including the prevention of a relapse 
into conflict. The hope therefore is to replace the historic 
emphasis and exclusion of economic violence with a more 
nuanced, contextualized, and balanced approach to the full 
range of justice issues faced by societies in transition. In this, we 
would take one step forward in moving beyond the constructed 
and self-imposed blind spots and biases of the field of 
transitional justice. 
 
